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THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP AND CULTURAL 

CONTINGENCIES IN TOTAL QUALITY 
MANAGEMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
Asbjorn Osland · 
This case study contmsts how leaders learn to build on existing cultural contingencies while 
implementing total quality management (fQM) in a Central American context. The specific 
contingencies discussed are high power distance in relation to the quality council and 
a/Jocentrism in reference to the cross-functional quality action teams. 
The approaches qftwo leade1:s are contrasted. One leader implements TQM interventions at 
multiple levels ofthe organization simultaneously; his approach has a statistically significant 
impact on employee attitudes. Another leader, in a different but comparable site, uses the 
TQM program opportunistically to further his managerial agenda and proves ineffective in 
changing employee attitudes. 
S ince culture reputedly accounts for more than tiny percent of the variance in managerial behavior (Hofstede, 1980), a leader must build on the cultural contingencies of the 
organizational setting when implementing organizational changes (Schein, 1992), such as total 
quality management (TQM). In the Central American context, two cultural contingencies are 
particularly imp011ant: high power distance-- the acceptance of unequal distribution of power 
within social institutions (Hofstede, 1980) -- and in-groups within Latin collectivist societies, 
which Ttiandis et al. (1988) rcfem~d to as allocentrism (Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai & 
Lucca, 1988). 
Since TQM is predicated on high levels of employee involvement (Juran & Gryna, 1993; 
Ishikawa, 1985), the organizational implications of high power distance must be understood. 
At first glance, high employee involvement seems to be in coni1ict with high power distance 
norms where both lenders and subordinates expect thnt only lenders will have the 
* Asbjorn Osland is an Assistant Profossor ofBusiness nnd Economics nt George Fox College, Newberg, Oregon. 
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tmquestionable power to make decisions. Employees will find it more difficult to express their 
views as equals with management, and leaders oilen find sharing power to be uncomfortable. 
For example, the autonomy of quality councils, which provide guidance and support for the 
TQM intervention (Sholtes, 1988) is sometimes Uu·eatened by the physical presence of top-level 
leaders in a high power distance setting. Though U1ey may understand the importance of 
granting autonomy to a quality council, they are likely to assume control, be it direct or 
tmohtrusive (PelTOW, 1986), when the pruiicip1u1ts f1mmder or move in a direction unanticipated 
by the leaders. 
Allocentrism, U1e second cultmal contingency, is manifested in the Central American work 
setting by strong departmental (in-group) loyalty and "we-they" attitudes and friction with other 
departments (out-groups). Organizations often experience turf battles and intergroup tension 
that does not lend itself to the cross-1\.mctional teamwork that is a hallmark of TQM. 
As TQM generally entails changing the organizational culture, the role of the leader is 
crucial to the success ofU1e intervention (Deming, 1986; Ishikawa, 1985; George, 1992; Juran 
& Gryna, 1993). Within this conte:-;t, kaders must develop clear strategies for implementation. 
Ishikawa ( 1985) refers to this as TQM policy deployment -- that is, consistent, explicit and 
concrete quality policies dil11.1sed to all level::; of the organization. TQM policy deployment is 
based on the leader's perception of the contingencies a!Tecting the implementation ofTQM. 
The research question that guides this study is: How can leaders deal successfully with 
existing cultural and organizational contingencies while implementing TQM, when this 
innovation promotes behavior contrary to the organizational and national culture? 
Since the research is based on grounded themy (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), the empirical 
data fi·om the participant observation phase enabled the author to operationalize the research 
question into the following propositions: 
( l) The leader is so prominent in a high power distance setting that he or she cannot 
actively participate in a quality council. 
(2) "Turtlsm" cru1 be overcome in cross-ftmctional quality action teams ifleaders build on 
the cultural contingencies of high power distance and allocenhism in the organizational 
change etlort to implement TQM. 
(3) Conversely, the change e!Tort could falter if such cultural contingencies are ignored. 
(4) TQM should he implemented through policy deployment at multiple levels of the 
organization. 
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METHODS 
Resenrch Setting 
The Tropical ExpCJJ1 Company is a family-controlled Nmih American based multinational 
corporation with very extensive production operations in Latin America that produce a labor 
intensive tropical export product, primarily fclr Nmih America and Europe. The company has 
a century long history in Latin America. It is one of the four major players in the industry. The 
two research sites (Bocagrande and Playa Negra, both production divisions) are economies-of­
scale operations (approximately 5,500-6,000 employees each) located in the Central American 
country ofMorazan --a fictitious name used to preserve the anonymity of the company. The 
village-like, relatively closed environments around the production divisions create social 
situations that are more e)o.:treme tlHlll those fmUld in most modem organizations. The distinction 
between work and social roles in these isolated company towns is often blmTed. 
TQM was generally welcomed at the administrative levels of the company but the general 
managers were hesitant to difi'use it too quickly into the union ranks as they feared tl1e union 
leaders would perceive it as a Machiavellian ploy to subveti the political solidarity of the union. 
Thus, the present research covers only the salaried persmmel and their involvement with TQM. 
Ethnographic Methodology 
I was a pmiicipant observer !l·om May 28, 1990 until July 23, 1992; I served as the human 
resources manager for the company in the country of Morazan. As an expatriate American 
citizen who had spent close to seven years in Latin America, tlrst with Peace Coq)s and then as 
a manager of a development project, I was i1uent in Spanish. At the time I took the job with the 
Tropical Expoti Company, I was a doctoral candidate in organizational behavior. I spent 
approximately one third of my time in Playa Negra, a third in Boca grande, and a third in the 
capital city office, with some time at Packaging, Inc., a subsidiary of the Tropical Export 
Company tl1at produced production and packaging material for Playa Negra and Bocagrande. 
As a pmiicipm1t obsetver m1d stair executive reporting to the same vice president as the general 
managers of Playa Negra and Bocagrande, I attended staff meetings, conversed with the 
employees, conducted over 150 intctviews, spoke frequently with cmvorate visitors from the 
U.S., m1d interacted socially wiU1 the residents of Playa Negra and Bocagrande who worked for 
the company. 
Survey Instrument 
The second phase ofU1e research involved the development of a questionnaire to measure 
organizational changes in relation to the TQM program. This instrument was translated by an 
educated native speaker fi·om tl1c region and revised by two bilingual educated individuals. The 
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questionnaire consisted of the relevant portions of the Socio-teclmical Systems Benchmark 
Sw-vey (Sabiers & Pasmore, 1992), several questions specifically developed for the survey, and 
an instrument to measure organizational commitment (Mowday, Steers & Porter, 1979). 
The Sabiers and Pasmore instrument consists of twenty scales used to measure the degree 
to which an organization follows sociotechnical systems design principles. Each scale or 
variable consists of a series of questions that yielded intemally consistent responses (i.e., 
Cronbach alpha greater U1ru1 .66). The instnm1ent utilizes a Like1i scale of I (strongly disagree) 
to 5 (strongly agree). An example of the questions used follows: "lnf01mation about my 
department's objectives is shared with me." The variables that proved reliable in this study 
appear below. 
Inclusion: This vruiable measures perceptions relating to the extent to which one interacts 
with other levels ru1d departments of the orgru1ization, is privy to financial and objectives related 
information, understands how decisions are made, and feels like a partner who is heard. 
Supportfor innovation: This scale measures perceptions relating to good ideas being put 
into practice, being encouraged to tJy new ways of doing things, and being rewarded for coming 
up with new ideas. 
Facilitative leadership: This scale focuses on receiving clear feedback, messages, and 
guidance fl·om one's superior plus the autonomy to figure out best how to work. 
Coope1·ation: This relates to assistance tJ·om co-workers. 
Upward influence: This scale measures perceptions ofhow well the supervisor listens to 
one's opinions, so!icil'l advice, and whether or not the subordinate is consulted on job changes. 
Activity feedback: This variable measures one's perceptions of feedback from others 
regarding the quality of one's work as well as the ability to give feedback to others. 
The questions developed for U1e sluvey measlu·ed group etTicacy (i.e., one's attitudes toward 
working in groups), positive attitude toward TQM, and positive view toward one's superior. 
Again, the respondents utilized a Likert scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). An 
example of the questions used follows: "When I talk to those who are involved in the TQM 
groups, I find that they seem enthusiastic about TQM." 
The organizational commitment measure also used a Like1i scale but measured from I 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). An example of the questions used follows: "I talk up 
this organization to my friends as a great organization to work for." 
J 
f 
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Selection of Survey Subj ccts 
The results of the implementation of TQM in Playa Negra were contrasted with the results 
in Bocagrande by looking for ~ignilicant di!Jerences between the TQM participants with the 
non-participants. 
The subjects in Playa Negra were divided into two groups, those involved in TQM (n=47) 
and those uninvolved (n=45). This sample included all the pruiicipants in TQM, with the 
exception ofthe members of the quality council. They were excluded because almost all the 
executives were members of the quality council, making it impossible to match them with non­
pruiiciprults at the same hierarchical level. The non-pmiicipant group was fonned by drawing 
arandom sample of comparable size and organizational level to match the TQM participants. 
In Bocagrande, the subjects were also divided into comparable groups, TQM (n=33) and 
non-TQM (n=37). Because fewer employees were involved in the TQM effcni here, it was 
necessary as well as feasible to include subjects at the executive level. Two stratified random 
samples of non-participants thm1 comparable levels of the organization were drawn from an 
employment roster. 
The two locations were similar in many respects. The etlmic makeup of the monthly 
employees who responded to the survey was almost unifonnly Latin with the exception of the 
European general manager in Bocagrande, Karl. Both general managers, several department 
heads, and some lower level monthly employees had worked in both locations. The 
technologies employed in both locations were essentially the same. The demographics of the 
subjects from Playa Negra and Bocagrnnde are shown in Table I. 
RESULTS 
Ethnographic 
TI1e case sh1dy was ru1 eJT01i to build grounded the01)' (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) around the 
role of leadership in the implementation of TQM. The impacts of the different managerial styles 
of the two leaders regru·ding employee involvement in the two locations were contrasted through 
qualitative data recorded during the participant observation phase and, later, a survey and 
follow-up interviews. I labeled the diiTerent TQM implementation approaches used by the 
leaders policy deployment (i.e., Anmmdo 's approach) versus managerial opportunism (i.e., 
Kru·J's approach). The contrasts between the managerial styles of the two managers are shown 
in Table 2. 
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Armando & Policy Deployment 
Armando, the general manager of Playa Negra, is native to that community. His father 
-provided services to the company. Almando was educated in the U.S. and completed a degree 
in the sciences. He began working for U1e company in a research capacity but moved to 
production where he spent his entire career of more than 25 years. He has highly developed 
political skills and charismatic leadership qualities. He is a large fit man who strikes an 
imposing image. He combines an engaging manner with total authority; one can speak frankly 
with him and challenge him with well founded arguments yet one is always aware of his 
authority. His talents are in production, including labor relations, and general leadership. He 
pennits the support functions (e.g., the controller's office and materials) considerable autonomy 
as long as policy is followed, budgets respected, and targets met. He handles the human 
resource functions for key people himself in terms of career development and succession 
planning and tends to plan and then offer options to subordinates, rather than converse with 
them to detem1ine how they see their careers developing. 
Annando derives his power fi·om the supp01i the organizational culture gives to the role 
of the general manager, the national culture's perception of power distance, and his ability to 
create and deploy policy. His fom1er controller in Playa Negra stated, "Annando does half the 
work of a controller in that he makes people follow the rules and is very cost conscious." Others 
who work with Almando also describe him as predictable. The methodical and deliberate 
approach he has adopted to TQM policy deployment is consistent with the approach he has 
taken in implementing other programs in the past. 
Karl & Managerial Opportunism 
Karl, the general manager ofBocagrande, was bom in the Caribbean and spent his early 
years in another Central Al11erican production division where his father worked. His 
background was clearly rooted in the neo-colonial history of the company, so much so that Karl 
did not become highly fluent in Spruush though he had resided in Latin America for much of his 
life; he understood Spruush and could make himself understood in poor Spanish. Karl attended 
boarding school in Europe where he was eventually educated as a military officer. He spent 
several years in a war zone, !ell the military, and eventually went to work for the Tropical 
Export Company. It is very conm1on for executives to an·ange for one or more of their children 
to be employed by the company. Nepotism is one of the bonds that holds the organizational 
culture together. Karl worked in many different locations including Playa Negra before his 
promotion to the general manager's slot in Bocagrande. Karl is very effective during crises, 
perhaps in prui due to Ius militruy background. He said the only remaining disaster that had not 
touched Boca grande during his tenure was a volcanic eruption. Karl is described by his 
subordinates with the English word "pusher," meaning one who gets things done through an 
insistence on task completion. 
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Demogl'll(lhics of Survey Particin:mh 

..l!lillD ~Util 
Department !!!l!! TOM Non-TOM !!!l!! TOM Non-TQM 
Production 44 22 22 28 9 19 
Controller's office 12 5 7 12 3 9 
Matenals 9 4 5 3 - 3 
Engineering 9 3 6 9 7 2 
Legal 
- - -
I 
-
I 
TramporU!tion/exp. 5 3 2 4 3 I 
General Manager's office 1 
-
1 5 5 
-
Quality control 7 7 3 -
Packaging 2 2 - -
Labor relations 2 
-
2 5 3 3 
Reswch I I - - - -
Total 91 47 45 70 33 37 
l:m!!!!Service 
0-5 5 I 4 4 2 2 
6-10 25 14 II 13 6 7 
11-15 24 13 II 15 6 9 
16·20 10 4 6 II 6 5 
More than 20 25 13 12 24 12 12 
Missing infom>ntion 1 2 I 1 I _2 
Total 92 47 45 70 33 37 
S! 
18-25 1 
-
I 3 I 2 
26-35 37 23 14 IS 5 10 
36-45 34 16 18 30 17 13 
Over45 17 8 9 16 7 9 
Missing infom1ation 1 3 6 1 3 
Total 91 47 45 70 33 37 
~ 
Male 84 46 38 67 31 36 
Female 8 I 7 1 2 I 
Total 92 47 45 70 33 37 
0£!!1e•llonal L•v•l 
Assistant foremen!unsldlled 7 I 6 I 0 I 
Foremen 31 15 16 2 
-
2 
Sldlled technician 13 7 6 14 5 9 
Unit manager/assistant 30 18 12 7 I 6 
Supervisor/professional 10 5 5 31 14 11 
Department hend!mannger 
- -
15 13 2 
Missing infomlntion I L - - - -
Total 92 45 70 33
" 
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Table 2 

Managerial Opportwusm versus PoUcy Deployment Strategies for Implementing Total Quality 

M anaecmcnt 

Factor 
Observations Relating Factor to 
Managerial Opportunism 
(Bocagrnnde) 
Observations Relating Factor to 
Policy Deployment (Playa Negra) 
Description of implementation 
process: 
Managers in council developed 
consensus view ofTQM priorities 
and implementation strategy 
before pushing it downward 
Massive training and 
implementation ofquality action 
teams concurrent with consensus 
building process in council. 
General manager's role: General manager coopted council 
to force preferential treatment of 
his proposals 
Gen. manager allowed council to 
develop autonomous consensus 
while pushing basic TQM 
downward. 
Initial policy deployment: Limited to preparing council & 
f.'lcilitators 
TQM introduction, leadership 
training. prob. solving within 
functional teams. Pushed by GM 
through internal coordinator. 
General change in employee 
involvement: 
None until manager's council was 
prepared to d ilfuse TQM to the 
lower levels of the hierarchy. 
Employees involved in functional 
teams in established units so 
hierarchy was not threatened. 
Datnbased dialogue used within 
esL'\blished patterns. 
Impact of department Socialized dept. heads allowed Dept. heads were unable to 
heads/supervisors: general manager to co-opt council. cooperate without leadership. 
Turf consciousness precluded 
cross functional teams. Quality 
council did not develop autonomy. 
Risks for general manager: Easy to slip into autocratic 
behavior. Socialization of 
department heads in quality 
council caused them to look to the 
general manager for guidance. 
The more they depended on the 
genernlmnnnger the less 
autonomous they became. 
GM risked alienating dept. heads 
ifhe pushed to hard too fast at 
lower levels. GM limited TQM 
policy deployment at lower levels 
to measures perceived by 
department heads and superv'rs as 
helping them. 
Given his style ofpushing to get results, Karl was eager to implement the different project: 
he envisioned -- so eager that he unabashedly manipulated the quality council into what h 
called "a manager's council." He expressed discontent that some of the people on the counci 
disagreed with him, so he "rotated" them ofithe council and replaced them with several of hi 
direct repotis whom he could cotmt on for supp01i. Given the employee's willingness to acceJ 
a high level ofdirect control fi·om the general manager, Karl's actions are by no means unusua 
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However, his subordinates complain about his inconsistency from one day to the other but 
accept it as the general manager's prerogative. 
Karl could be characterized as one who was deeply concerned for the welfare of his 
employees, consistent with tl1e patemalistic background oftl1e company. The otl1er side ofiliis 
paternalism was the command and control orientation of the expatriate managers. Karl's 
military backgrmmd and his family's roots in tl1e neocolonial past of the company probably both 
contributed to his conunand and control orientation and desire for direct control. 
Karl had grown up within the company and as an adult worked in remote locations for more 
than 15 years; he was strongly socialized to the company town culture found in the production 
divisions and therefore somewhat insular. In contrast to Annando, who attempted to develop 
social contacts outside the company, Karl spent most of his fi·ee time with company employees 
or contractors. Though ve1y capable and intellectually gifted, Karl's insularity made him 
somewhat resistant to change. Though he understood TQM, he continued to exhibit the strong 
direct control general managers always had. Managerial opportunism resulted. 
ObservntionsNigncttes 
The direct control (i.e., orders issued by the powerful -- Pen·ow, 1986) of the general 
managers was significant. It was based on the power given to the position by the company and 
the cultural emphasis 011 high power distance. Historically, the general managers had always 
been expatriates and operated in relatively isolated locations managing operations that faced 
great unce1iainty in tenns of govemmental and union relations and production conditions. 
These high levels of unee1ininty, coupled with the neocolonialist orientation of tl1e company, 
gave the role of the general manager great power over the employees and others dependent on 
the company. For example, one Spanish businessman stated that many years ago he bought the 
first car owned by a "civilian" (i.e., non-company resident) in Bocagrande. When it was 
delivered 011 the company train, the general manager initially refused to allow it to be unloaded 
saying he hadn't given his authorization. Thus, t11e general manager had been and continued to 
be seen as a very powerf11l figure within the company towns. 
High power distance continued to be evident in the relationships between superiors and 
subordinates. Superiors commonly expressed the need to dominate subordinates. For example, 
a subordinate, a professional, threatened to quit if he did not receive a raise in his salmy to 
increase it to a level compm·able to that of other employees at his level. His manager swore the 
human resources manager to secrecy and snid, "Julian is ve1y good." The inference was that 
subordinates should not be told by their superiors how valuable they were because such 
knowledge would give them power. For another depmiment head, hierarchy was more than 
simple power associated with a senior position. It had a raw element to it wherein his authority 
could not be questioned. He e:-:pressed the explicit desire that his subordinates fear him. His 
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preference for primitive domination was extreme but such a desire for control over subordinates 
was not unusual in the corporate culture. He actually asked ti1e human resources manager (i.e., 
the author) to do a survey feedback of his depm1.ment to find out if his subordinates held a 
sufficient degree offear for him. Some of the more interesting stories came out as people stood 
around the bar in the evenings discussing how the Americans had been very strict in the past, 
in the neo-colonial era before 1970. One relatively uneducated individual who had become a 
senior level manager related how he had leamed English; he said, "It was easy. My boss said, 
'No Spanish'!" 
By reviewing some of the qualitative data regarding the TQM implementation process, 
obtained through pmticipant observation, one can better understand how policy deployment, as 
implemented in Playa Negra by Armando, had a more beneficial impact than the managerial 
opportllllism ofKm'l. 
Involvement of the Leaders With the Quality Councils 
Both general managers had attended seminars where they were taught that TQM practices 
involved employee involvement and relative autonomy for the quality council, the group 
appointed to guide the TQM process. Part of Annando's understm1ding of the process was that 
he should not inte1vene in the quality cow1cil's activities. He used his understanding of the need 
for an autonomous council to restrain himself in the quality council meetings he attended. His 
actions were guided by the policy he had deployed, which included autonomy for the council. 
He was able to avoid the culturally induced reflex of directing the activities of the council 
because he had adopted a policy toward TQM. This policy became a cognitive road map that 
he followed. 
The cotmcil proved capable of taking some initiative after 18 months ofmarginal activity, 
but this break1.1u·ough occulTed only after Annando finally ordered them to remain in the room 
lllltil they developed a plan to make the quality council etTective in its leadership ofTQM. His 
direct control was consistent with the style of leadership practiced in Morazan, but he removed 
himself:fi:om the discussion to foster U1e autonomy he perceived as essential for a quality council 
within TQM. After his departure, the quality council chose to replace the ineffectual leader of 
the quality cotmcil, a young expatriate controller, with the second-in-conunand, the production 
manager. 
An outsider might wonder how there could be such a difference between the power of the 
general manager and the second-in-command. The second-in-ctmunand was highly respected 
hut not feared in the same way as the general manager. There can only be one maximum 
authority in U1e hierm·chy, embedded in U1e high power distance Latin society, of the production 
division. The individual filling that role deals with most of ti1e decisions required to resolve 
uncertainty, a basic source of power within organizations (Crozier, 1964). 
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H 
ac In contrast to the policy deployment ofA1111ando, Karl, the general manager ofBocagrande 
chose to co-opt the quality council and use it to oppotiunistically pursue his own agenda for the 
division. Given the organizational members' willingness to accept a high level of direct control 
from the general manager, his actions were by no means unusual. He told me that the councilen 
was a "manager's council" that he controlled. He related one anecdote to the author regarding pa 
the control of the cognitive premises for action, an example of an unobtrusive control described 
mi 
co 	 by Perrow (1986). Those who achieved the rank of depmiment head were usually very skillful 
at organizational politics; they gave ample consideration to what they perceived the desires of 
the general manager to be. According to Karl, "Even if I ask a question, they are trying to guess 
what's on my mind."tha 
di\ 
SO( Another example of the power of the control over the cognitive premises for action in a 
or high power distance setting was found in a packaging subsidiat}' of the Tropical Export 
Company, which was not swveyed due to its dissimilar context-- it was an urban manufacturing sor 
facility lead by professional engineers. The general manager was asked by his second-in­dir· 
command, the head of the quality council, not to attend the council meetings until the members 
had a specific proposal to present to him. His second-in-command believed that if the general 
manager were present he would unduly sway the council, thereby precluding genuine 
pwticipation. Simple questioning on the part of the general manager was enough to influence 
the COUI1cil members because they would attempt to detem1ine what it was the general manager 
mw 
WU!lted and then tailor their comments and suggestions accordingly. Although the second-in­the 
command still possessed a great deal of authority, he was not accorded the same deference asbee 
the general manager. gre 
The 
Thus, 	in reference to the 1irst proposition, one could conclude that the leader is toogav 
prominent in such high power distance settings to be able to effectively pmticipate in a quality the 
council.firs 
deli 
Allocentrism and Cross Functional Teamssayi 
be s 
The traditional importw1ce given to hicrw·chy and "turf" made it difticult to introduce cross 
fi.mctional teams in Playa Negra nnd Bocagrande. Allocentrism, with its emphasis on in-groups, 
fosters the turfism that TQM is to break down through cross functional teams.sub< 
a SL 
Depmtmcnt heads and supetvisors were regularly described by their subordinates in themen 
production divisions as people to 1em·. Subordinates found it di11icult to interact with peers from burr 
other departments when they were unsure about what their supervisor or depmtment head sub1 
desired. Tllis demm1d fi·om supetiors for personal loyalty from their subordinates, coupled with kno· 
allocentrism, constrained cross functional problem solving in both the production divisions. Sllllf 
Ignoring these cultural contingencies and attempting to impose cross functional teams too sooncoul 
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caused the TQM implementation process to falter initially in Playa Negra, confim1ation of 
proposition tlu·ee. 
The TQM coordinator in Playa Negra related how they addressed tl1is problem. After 
encountering initial resistance, the general manager, Annando, advised him not to push 
interdepru1mental problem solving quite so aggressively; instead he suggested limiting ilie 
problem solving teams to depm1ments until the department heads became more accepting. 
Later, A.n11ando instructed him to adopt the following hybrid solution, which ilie TQM 
coordinator described as: 
A key operations manager was assigned a quality problem. He was fuen 
empowered to choose the members of his or her team which included people 
from other depm1ments. These people met and analyzed fue specific problem. 
Significant improvements in quality outcomes resulted. The market feedback has 
been very positive. 
Allowing respected individuals to name their own team members builds upon the cultural 
value of traditional respect for leaders. The team leaders named people they felt were 
trustworthy and competent with regard to tl1e problem to be solved and with whom they enjoyed 
mutual respect. Though tl1e team members came fi·om vrnious depm1ments, they found conunon 
ground in their strong relationships with the team leader as well as their perceived competency 
relating to tl1e problem under study. Thus, this solution succeeded because it was compatible 
witl1 existing cultural values conceming leadership (i.e., high power distance), hard work and 
loyalty, and took into consideration the strong sense of in-group feeling (i.e., allocentrism) as 
well as the competence of the individuals chosen. AI111ando's awareness of these culturally 
based unobtrusive controls facilitated the TQM implementation process, thereby confirming 
proposition two. One must recall tl1at Amwndo was native to the culture whereas Karl was not; 
it is logical that Annando would devise a culturally astute means of implementing cross 
:fi.mctional teams tl1at promoted TQM while not asking the participants to stray too far from their 
cultural assumptions. 
Quantitative 
Policy deployment at multiple levels of the organization proved more effective than 
managerial oppo111uusm. This was tested by contrasting the pm1icipants of the TQM program 
with the non-pru1iciprn1ts in both Playa Negra and Boca grande. Since the samples were small, 
witl1 non-nomml disi.Jibutions, nonprn·rn11CI.Jic tests were used. The means were ranked for each 
oftl1e variables using the Kruskal-Wallis test. The median test was also employed to contrast 
the TQM rn1d non-TQM groups using tl1e stuvey vrn·iables previously discussed; it ranked cases 
above and below the median. In the case of Playa Negra, the TQM pm1icipants were 
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significantly differentiated fi·om the non-participants in te1ms of the following variables: ' 
inclusion, upward influence, activity feedback, and attitude toward TQM, as shown in Table 3. 
The results for Bocagrande (see Table 3) dillerentiated the TQM pmticipants from the non­
participants only with regards to inclusion, which was higher for TQM pruticipants. Non­
participants, however, rep01ted a higher level of organizational conunitment. None of the 
Kruskai-Wallis tests were supported by significant results from the median tests. Since 
nonpararnetric tests are fairly weak, the significant findings for the Kruskal-Wallis tests reported 
for Bocagrande in Table 3 should be viewed with caution. Fmthennore, there are alternative 
explanations for the significant findings in Bocagrandb that may be unrelated to TQM. For 
example, inclusion may be higher for the TQM participants in Bocagrande because 13 of the 
15 subjects in this group are at the bonus eligible level. They pmticipate in managerial decision 
making because of their position, not their TQM involvement. Organizational conunitment 
could have been higher for non-TQM respondents because the previously mentioned executives 
are better educated and have more altematives outside of the organization. Thus their 
dependency on the company may be weaker than those with little education who have more 
limited employment altematives. Those with little education would have difficulty finding jobs 
that paid more than the ones they held within the company. Therefore, we cmmot conclude that 
TQM had an impact in Bocagrande, as measured by the survey results repmted in Table 3. 
In conclusion, Almando, the leader in Playa Negra, simultaneously focused on multiple 
levels of the organization tlu·ough TQM policy deployment. The preceding statistical results 
from Table 3 show that Am1ando's policy deployment had an impact. In contrast, Karl's 
managerial opportunism (i.e., first aligning the quality council with the leader's perception of 
TQM) did not have a comparably significant impact. One could asse1t that Karl really had not 
implemented TQM but rather his perception of how TQM techniques could serve his agenda-­
i.e., managerial opportunism. The greater success of policy deployment versus managerial 
opportunism confinns proposition four. 
DISCUSSION 
Ethnogrnphic 
The conceptual implications for practice point to the necessity of acknowledging and 
building upon cultural and organizational contingencies. If high power distance is prominent, 
one cannot expect a quality council to assume an autonomous role if the general manager or 
leader is present --even as a silent observer. On the other hand, relatively leaderless groups 
were also incapable ofilmctioning ellcctively. Using the second-in-conunand to lead the quality 
council seems to satisiy the need for leadership as well as allowing the quality council members 
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to feel relatively fi·ee to express their views, thereby fostering a measure of autonomy essential 
to the quality council within TQM. 
Table 3 

Sienilicant OifTucn.-es Retwecn TQI\1 and Non-TQI\1 Rl.'spontlcnts 
Playa Negra 
Kruoka~WalllsNonparamelrk Test 
Variables: lnclu•lon 
 Upward lnOuence 
 Activity Feedback 
 Attitude Toward TQM 

Mean!l!.!!!> Mean!l!.!!!> t!t! M.!ll!!l Il!.!!!> t! M.!ll!!l Il!.!!!> t! 

lnTQM 52.78 46 
 55.49 47 
 54.31 47
51.81 47 

Nolin 39.07 45 
 37.11 45 
 38.34 45 

TQM 

39.8 44 

(X'-6.18; p=.O 129) (X'=II.OI; p=.0009) <x'=4.74; p=.0295) <x'=8.33; p=.0039) 
Playa Negra 
Median Nonparametrlt- Test 
Variables: AHU11de Toward TQM llpV13rd Innuence A<livlly Feedback 
>Median <Median>Median <Me<lian >Median <Median 
26 21
lnTQM 22 25 
 28 19 

NotinTQM II 34 
 II 34
15 29 

Median-3.67; 
<x'=4.o7; p=.0436) 
Meolian=3.33; Meolian=3.33; 
(X'=7.88; p=.0050)<x'=4.94; p=.0262l 
Bocagrande 
KrusknJ..Walllr Nonparatnell'lc Test 
Variables: Inclusion Organlz.ailonal Commitment 
M.!ll!!l rnnk t!~!D.!lk t! 
lnTQM 39.79 34 
 28.98 33 

Nolin 30.34 35 
 39.7 35 

TQM 

(X'=3.85; p=.0499) <x'=5.oo: p=.0254) 
As indicated previously, Playa Negra initially followed conventional TQM methodology 
and assigned cross functional teams. Allocentrism and "ttufism" hindered the effectiveness of 
these groups so they resorted to functional teams, much like quality circles. When Armando 
realized that 1mmy orgmlizational problems were of a cross functional nature, he encouraged the 
quality council to have respected managers lead the quality action teams and choose their own 
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members. This solution is consistent with both high power distance and allocentrism, in that 
a recognized leader is fi·ee to choose members fl'om his or her in-group. Such an in-group may 
reflect personal loyalties fi·om vruious departments rather than functional area loyalties, thereby 
permitting a cross functional approach to operate. This may be a way to avoid the resistance 
initially faced when cross functional groups are imposed on organizational systems susceptible 
to turfism; one achieves cross functional problem solving and conununication but in a culturally 
sensitive manner. 
Quantitative 
Annando's policy deployment approach was effective because it was based on a cognitive 
framework that considered the critical organizational and cultural contingencies and attempted 
to change the organization at multiple levels simultaneously. This cognitive road map was 
important in countering the strong cultural pull of autocratic leadership. The clarity and 
consistency in TQM training ru1d quality action team activities fostered a more positive attitude 
among participants than non-participants. 
Annando realized that a cascading approach, fi·om top to bottom, would not produce the 
desired chru1ge in that his immediate :-mbordinates, the depmiment heads and supervisors, would 
likely be obstacles as they would see their power and autonomy tlu·eatened. Therefore, he did 
not expect them to change rapidly. He cotTectly assumed that those at the lower levels would 
prove very interested in TQM as it o!Tered them a chance to have more impact through 
collaborative problem solving. On several occasions he was encouraged by consultants to press 
his direct reports to take more initiative in the quality council and to be more accepting of cross 
functional teams. However, he refused to be strongly assertive," I know I could beat them over 
the bead and, like good soldiers, they'd do what I want. However, I could be transfen·ed at any 
time and total quality would stop if they didn't assume ownership." 
The other leadership approach observed in this study, managerial oppotiunism, did not 
produce significant diiTerences that can be solely attributed to TQM training and patiieipation 
in quality action teams. Oppoi1tmism created an ad hoe inconsistency that allowed 
capriciousness to manifest itself as autocratic behavior (e.g., Karl's co-optation of the quality 
council). 
Therefore, one can conclude that a simultaneous focus on multiple levels of tl1e 
organization through TQM policy deployment at various levels of the organization (i.e., the 
saturation approach) was more e!Tective U1ru1 a cascading approach handicapped by managerial 
opportunism. Table 3 shows the attitudinal di1Terences of the TQM pmiicipants, reflected in 
terms of inclusion, upward influence, activity feedback, and positive attitude toward TQM, in 
relation to non-TQM participants in Playa Negra. This was not the case. in Bocagrande. 
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However, in a sense, Karl had not really implemented TQM but rather his perception of how 
TQM techniques could serve his agenda, i.e., managerial opportunism. 
Implications 
Thus, the initial action steps one might suggest, in regard to cultural contingencies, when 
implementing TQM are for the leader to first interpret the organizational and national culture 
(Schein, 1992). Leaders should be sensitized to the culture of the specific location. The next 
step is to realize that cultural continuity can be a foundation for innovation while providing a 
satisfying envirorunent for the employees (Salipante, 1992; Fry & Srivastva, 1992). This 
involves looking for solutions that incorporate cultural contingencies in a way that promotes 
rather than hinders the implementation process; the leader needs to make effective use of 
unobtrusive controls (Pen·ow, 1986), based on culture (e.g., Armando's cross functional teams) 
in the implementation process. The leader also must understand that the itmovation needs to be 
modified during the adoption process (Lewis & Seibold, 1993); an off-the-shelf or cookie-cutter 
approach to innovation is especially risJ..-y when dealing with cultural contingencies. 
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